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ABSTRACT
The International Space Station (ISS) will receive an
armada of visiting supply vehicles during its life in
orbit. Over 500 tons of material will be destroyed in
targeted re-entries of these vehicles. Because all such
re-entries lie in the same orbital plane of the station, and
because the visiting vehicles typically deorbit within a
few hours of departure, the ISS will usually be within
sight of the re-entry process, at a range of only 300-600
kilometers. This vantage point offers an unprecedented
opportunity for systematically measuring hypersonic
destructive processes. This paper examines the
integrated operational constraints of the ISS, its supply
vehicles, and candidate sensors which can be employed
in the scientific observation of the re-entry process. It is
asserted the ISS program has the potential to reduce the
worldwide risks from future deorbiting spacecraft,
through systematic experimental characterization of the
factors which affect the rupture, debris survival, and
footprint size of its visiting vehicle fleet.
1. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The experimental study of hypersonic phenomena is one
of the most difficult branches of engineering, owing to
the near impossibility of achieving sustained
temperatures, pressures, molecular distribution, and
especially velocities that match the region of interest in
a laboratory setting. At best, certain conditions can only
be obtained in shock tunnels for the briefest of times,
and at great expense. The hypersonic re-entry of a
spacecraft, by comparison, is a progressive event
involving huge variations in Knudsen Number, Mach
Number, and Reynolds Number, as the vehicle
experiences exponential increases in density,
temperature, and pressure. The vehicle itself
progressively changes ballistic coefficient as
appendages soften and fold or separate, finally reaching
combinations of torque, heating, vibration, and pure
dynamic pressure which combine to lead to the vehicle's
structural failure, or rupture. Following the initial
rupture, a new progressive phase is entered, as the
remnants continue to shed yet smaller fragments.
As the spacefaring nations and private corporations of
the world begin the new millennium, over one hundred
boosters and a growing number of satellites will re-enter
earth's atmosphere each year, thus posing an increasing
threat to all inhabitants under the orbital path. The
processes which affect the generation, spread, and
survival of the debris from these re-entry objects are for
the most part only qualitatively understood. The
problem of obtaining systematic experimental data on
the re-entry process is compounded by the need to
conduct all intentional destructive re-entries over the
most remote portions of the planet, thus making
scientific observation difficult and expensive. Further,
there are military and/or national security implications
in the majority of the previous intentional re-entries,
meaning that the detailed data, when it does exist, is not
easily shared among nations.
2. APPROACH
The International Space Station (ISS) program provides
the potential to overcome all of the mentioned
impediments to research in the field of hypersonic re-
entries. Although the multinational study postulated
here has not been formally agreed, members of the
partner agencies are just beginning discussions of the
constraints and opportunities that would shape such a
study. This paper provides an interim view of the
potential capabilities for ISS-based hypersonic science,
and the constraints that may bound the work.
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The ISS wilt receive an armada or visiting vehicles
(VV) during its life in orbit. (Fig 1). The supply
vehicles that will destructively re-enter include the 7-ton
Russian Progress, the orbital module and Instrument
Module of the Russian Soyuz, the European Space
Agency's Autonomous Transfer Vehicle (ATV), and the
National Space Development Agency of Japan's
(NASDA)'s H2 Transfer Vehicle (HTV). In addition,
several deorbit propulsion stages (DPS) of the American
Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) will be destroyed after
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separation from the survivable lifting body, as it is
periodically returned to Earth for refurbishment.
Together, over 500 tons of material will be destroyed in
targeted re-entries of the scheduled vehicles, and
hundreds more tons will re-enter in the form of spent
orbital and suborbital stages of their boosters. (Total is
not shown in Fig. I, but one Shuttle External Tank (ET)
is shown for reference) These scheduled events do not
include the potential future commercial transports which
have yet to be incorporated into the fleet. Because all
such vehicles lie in the same orbital plane of the station,
and because the visiting vehicles themselves deorbit
within a few hours of departure, the ISS will usually be
within sight of the re-entry process, at a range of only
300-400 kilometers.
3. GEOMETRY
The ISS and its departing visiting vehicle originate at
the same location and velocity, typically in a circular
orbit near 400 km altitude. A coordinated separation
sequence moves the VV outside of a 2-kilometer
Approach Ellipse (AE). Since the ISS itself will always
fly in the same basic orientation (LVLH, with X axis in
the velocity vector, Z axis towards nadir), vehicles will
be limited in their choice of departure direction, based
solely upon the location of their docking port. (Relative
to the ISS, the vehicles will need to clear radially
outwards from their release point, in a direction which
does not approach any other part of the ISS structure.
The HTV, which is released from the nadir forward
region, will therefore need to depart in a different
direction than a Progress leaving from the aft docking
port.). Drift rates continue to separate the vehicles.
It is currently planned that once any vehicle has
departed, it should not re-cross the orbital path of the
ISS, for safety concerns. Thus, ISS will likely have
different views of different vehicles, unless the deorbit
bum occurs shortly after departure from the AE, making
the differences (fore and aft) negligible. Figures 2 and 3
show the viewing geometry of vehicles which begin
their deorbit burns respectively 400 km behind the
station. and 100 km in front of it.
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The relative motion plots have the same characteristic
shape for the two vehicles. The VV is assumed to start
from position (0,400) km in X,Y. The plots cover 45
minutes of trajectory, and trace the position relative to
where the VV would have been had it not executed a
deorbit burn. The ISS is positioned at some relative
distance in front of (Fig. 2) or behind (Fig. 3) this initial
point. Because the deorbit event is only half an orbit,
the ISS stays nearly stable relative to this starting point
for the duration. Viewing angles and attitudes are then
easy to visualize. Diamonds mark ]-minute intervals.
Post rupture, debris sweeps aft at high rate.
It is notable that the entire deorbit process, from engine
ignition through subsonic debris tumble, can be visible
from the station, although in a practical limit, only the
region of greatest interest may be visible through any
one viewing port. The ISS itself cannot be maneuvered
rapidly, because it is so large (over 100 meters in width,
and over 60 meters tall). Typical maneuver rates are 0.1
deg/sec, or exactly the speed of the minute hand of a
clock. Maximum maneuver rate is approximately 0.2
deg/sec in any axis.
4. VIEWING
Several excellent viewing ports exist on the nadir side,
including the 22-inch US Destiny Laboratory window,
and several large windows in the Russian Zvezda
Service Module. At least one of these Russian windows
is understood to be quartz, to allow infrared
observations. Together they allow high throughput of a
wide range of optical wavelengths. Although
approximately 80-degree fields of view are theoretically
possible from the largest windows, the actual FOV will
nominally be much less, because of obscuration by
external modules, or even by competing observational
gear in the windows. Internal geometric conflicts will
be exacerbated because the optics for the cameras will
be the longest and widest of the available lenses, for use
in recording events over 300 km away. The US
Laboratory window is the least obscured of the ISS
viewing ports. However, there are other large optical
instruments which will compete for this resource. The
author is investigating the possible shared use of some
payload optics proposed for other research in the
window.
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Fig 4 ISS Visiting Vehicles
4.1 Operational Constraints
There are Might restrictions regarding the best windows
on the ISS. They are nominally covered to protect
against damage from orbital debris. The Program is
hesitant to open the covers if the windows are exposed
to the velocity vector, out of concern for damage. Thus,
the deorbit viewing as depicted in Figure 2 will require
special care and resolution of competing technical
desires, since the best optical configuration in this
scenario would be to pitch the ISS upwards
approximately 60 degrees, to put the regime of interest
along the optical axis of the window for least distortion.
This attitude creates a ram pointing of the windows.
The flight rules allow the ISS to maneuver to and to
hold almost any attitude for a single orbit, before it is
required to return to its nominal LVLH attitude or
thermal and power balance. Fortunately, the deorbit
event occurs over a half-orbit, and the maximum
excursion (60 degree pitch) would take only 10 minutes
to achieve at nominal maneuver rates, so the experiment
can easily stay within the one-orbit out-of-attitude
maximum. Of greater concern is the need to return the
ISS to microgravity operations as soon as possible after
undocking of a Visiting Vehicle (a disturbance event).
These operations can only be maintained in the LVLH
attitude, plus or minus 15 degrees in each of pitch, roll,
and yaw. Therefore, if an off-nominal attitude is
required for the viewing, it is probable that the deorbit
must occur within a day of the departure or arrival of a
vehicle, which is the normally scheduled time that the
ISS will not be in microgravity research configuration.
Note (Fig. 5) that an intentional 15-degree yaw bias can
de-conflict a module obstruction of the nadir Laboratory
window. The same yaw bias will also de-conflict the
view from the high-gain directional antenna suite at the
aft end of the Service Module, should radio
communications be possible through any of the systems
which share that pointing platform.
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Fig. 5 Nadir View of ISS
5. STABIITY
The ISS attitude is maintained by control moment
gyroscopes (CMGs), and pointing is determined by a
combination of inertial systems, differential GPS, and
star sensors. At assembly complete, the attitude
knowledge will be 0.5 degrees (36) per axis, and drift
rates (due to diurnal variances in atmospheric
torque,etc) will be much less than 0.01 deg/sec per axis
(36), approaching .00033 deg/sec in pitch. There will
be slight variation in these parameters as the ISS grows
through its various assembly stages, but these values are
useful for determining relative motion with great
accuracy. At least one optical payload currently
includes designs to couple precise camera pointing
servo-systems with attitude data from the ISS
navigation system, to get absolute earth-relative
pointing. Such data will ultimately be useful in
resolving the details of the re-entry ballistics. If further
ballistic negotiations permit a choice in event viewing,
the scenario described in Fig. 3 provides the best
possible situation, to optimize the stability of the view.
In this case, the moment of rupture is stationary in the
view, and drifts at a steady 0.2 deg/sec for nearly 20
minutes (diamond marks) before the rupture. (Fig. 6).
The Fig. 2 scenario shows that while the event will
occur closer to the ISS, the relative motion will be far
more dramatic, and a would be larger challenge for
tracking optics to achieve both the wide range of
angular velocities and wide field of view. As a
reference, the tracking payload camera that is currently
being considered for other use on ISS has a total sweep
of only 10 degrees. It would therefore be able to
capture a far larger duration of the event in Figure 2's
scenario than in Figure 3. The scenario in figure 2, as
mentioned in part 4.1 above, presents a window
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Fig. 6: dTheta/ dt of VV from ISS vantage
6. OPTICS
There will be a variety of optical recording systems
aboard the ISS, including film and digital still cameras,
and High-Definition Television (HDTV). HDTV is
currently only planned for the interior of the ISS,
although several steerable external cameras on the truss
and other locations will provide NTSC video (480 line
resolution). The HDTV cameras are expected to be the
most useful off-the-shelf recorders of deorbit events (at
1125 lines of resolution, this is better than fine-grain
35mm film). At 16-power magnification, the resolution
of HDTV at 600 km is approximately 32 meters. Larger
optics and/or closer distances have the prospect of
bringing the resolution of the event to equal the size of
the VV. A practical limit to the lens size is the length
and width of a standard launch/stowage locker, which,
including packing materials, will limit the diameter of a
lens to approximately 25 cm. This gives a theoretical
diffraction limit of 1.8 meter resolution at 600 km
range, and sub-meter resolution at 300 km. Such optics
are not currently planned for the ISS, but could be a
future enhancement or payload. Therefore, at typical
commercial lens combinations, the resolution will be
limited by the recording medium, and not by the optics
path, and will remain approximately equal to the vehicle
typical radius.
7. RADIO CAPABILITIES
There is no single standard for radio communications
between the ISS and its visiting vehicle fleet. Each
station partner has created its own radio suite to
communicate with its ground control center and with the
ISS. Therefore, it is difficult to characterize the
"standard" suite of data that might be obtained. Further,
since the VV are autonomous of ISS operations after
departure from the 2 km AE, the radio sets are currently
not optimized for long-range data transmission to the
ISS.	 It is TBD whether the vehicles will maintain
communications with geostationary relay satellites.
However, the proximity of the ISS to the VV rupture
provides several promising possibilities, that are as of
this writing only conjecture. The ISS is essentially a
flying antenna farm, with dozens of frequencies at its
disposal, including several highly directional systems.
As an example, the Russian Ku-band system is not
configured for passive radar capability, but its antenna
does have an unobstructed view of the entire event.
Future enhancements could theoretically adapt this or
other assets on the ISS to assist in the data gathering.
One extremely promising possibility is the (currently
unfunded) development of a survivable, strap-down re-
entry 'Black Box", similar in function and design to an
aircraft flight data recorder. Such a standard device
would include its own internal power, accelerometers
and other sensors, thermal protection, as well as a
standardized transmitter, and potentially a data input
connector for deployable remote sensors (such as taped-
down thermistors, positioned by the crew on the
pressurized compartment walls). The black box would
be built so as not to require design modifications to any
VV, and would mount to existing mounts on the hatch.
The crew could attach the black box to the vacuum side
of the VV hatch after closeout, and before closure of the
ISS side of the vestibule. (This technique has been used
to attach several previous experiments to departing
Progress vehicles at Russian Space Stations).
The proposed "black box" would ride down with the VV
and record the accelerations and temperatures leading
LIP to rupture. Immediately thereafter, triggered by the
high accelerations of rupture as recorded by the internal
accelerometers, the black box would activate its own
detachment mechanism, and spring free of the hatch. At
this point, the box would have a short window of time to
decelerate out of the plasma cloud, and play back its
recorded data to the space station, that would still be
within view, only a few hundred km away. The device
would not need to survive past this transmission point.
This on-board instrumentation of the rupture process
would be a first, and could easily be standardized, for
there are only two types of docking/berthing mechanism
hatches for the entire fleet, and a common receiver
platform in the form of the ISS. The prospect of large
production runs of the sensors for use on the scores of
ISS visiting vehicles could bring the cost per unit to just
a few percent of the cost of an airborne observation
expedition, with better (directly measured, onboard)
data from the event.
8. EXPERIMENT PARAMETERS/VARIABLES
The VV fleet is optimized to deliver cargo to the ISS.
Therefore, there is nominally little flexibility in the
delta-V budget (and in some cases, power budget (HTV,
CRV), and even li% support budget (Soyuz, CRV))
during the disposal process. However, within the
margin, each vehicle will have a small range of possible
re-entry angles, vacuum perigees, etc. Tumble, spin,
and/or entry attitude are relatively simple parameters
that can be varied without significant impact to the
vehicle's propellant budget. Other factors are possible,
but will require further discussion. Such factors include
entry latitude, vacuum perigee, and TBD specific
passivization techniques. Each of these measures may
require trades of ISS cargo needs for VV propellant or
for deorbit specific hardware, that have not been
negotiated.
The chance to directly record re-entry of insertion stages
will occur approximately for one in every fourteen
launches, based upon pure statistical chances of the
event occurring within the 1/7th of the ground track
visible from the station's 400km altitude. This assumes
that the ISS can be maneuvered to direct at least one
sensor on the event. Per the discussion on microgravity
in section 4, this may not always be possible, even when
the event is within the line-of-sight of the ISS.
Conversely, a much larger fraction of the insertion stage
events will be visible if one considers that the station
will arrive over the decelerated debris cloud within
minutes after the rupture, even when the event occurs
beyond the ISS forward horizon. Radar capabilities
would be most appropriate to this type of post-rupture
viewing, but as mentioned above, such a capability has
not been developed yet. Some useful data might be
gathered from smoke or residual plasma trails.
Experience with this sort of observation may suggest
enhanced techniques that could routinely and
inexpensively gather post-rupture debris spread. The
insertion stages of the H2 and the Ariane 5 rockets are
understood to include controlled deorbit capability. The
constraints on this capability have not yet been
explored, but the controllability of the event may open
increased opportunities for optimized observations.
9. PROGRAMMATICS
The physics of the deorbit viewing provides a relatively
simple engineering integration challenge. However, the
financial and political factors will require special
attention if such a systematic deorbit study is to be
conducted.
First, outside of the approach envelope, operations
planning and control of the VV is under the exclusive
authority of the visiting vehicle provider. Integrated
operations of the ISS vehicle are under NASA's control.
Because of this agreement to partition responsibility, no
formal discussions have yet occurred to document
cooperative work outside of the Approach Envelope.
For a deorbit science campaign to be properly
coordinated, new areas of international cooperation will
need to be explored, and agreed by the partners.
Further, NASA's current agreements with each ISS
partner are bilateral. In order to maximize the scientific
return, it will be necessary to work multilaterally, and to
overcome the potential issues with export and sharing of
sensitive technological data on the performance of the
individual visiting vehicles, which are national assets of
the ISS partner agencies. Multilateral cooperation may
also need to expand to financial commitments, if ISS
radio, optical, or other instrument enhancements are
developed for common use by the partners in
characterizing their vehicle's deorbit performance.
Examples of such financial cooperation would be the
potential cost savings from large production runs of
deorbit "black box" recorders, and the development of
associated common radio receiver gear or of radar
tracking capability for the ISS.
Finally, the safety of the ground population is
paramount. While parametric variation is key to any
scientific endeavor, deorbit experimentation must
remain within the certified, safe operating capabilities of
the visiting vehicles and of the ISS. Efforts to
systematize the data gathering must be tempered with
the need to conduct every deorbit event in the safest
possible manner. As with any flight test program, the
operating envelope must be expanded with caution.
Thus, clear guidelines must be jointly accepted by all
partners sharing in the study for any increased liability
or risk that results from expanding the operating
envelope of any deorbit event, done under the auspices
of an international deorbit science campaign.
10. CONCLUSION
It is the author's hope that all technical and legal
obstacles can be overcome, and that the ISS program
partners will be able to take advantage of the
unprecedented opportunity that lies ahead. The
International Space Station's proximity, vantage point,
stability, and remarkable instrumentation suite offer the
potential to expand hypersonic re-entry science to the
same extent that space-based observations have
advanced the field of astronomy, and at negligible
additional expense.. Through such experimentation, the
Visiting Vehicle fleet offers a chance for the world's
space powers to make major advances in the scientific
understanding of (and the control of the risks from) the
re-entry process.
